Abstract-As an extension of identity-based encryption scheme, attribute-based encryption scheme also has the key escrow problem. Multi-authority attribute-based encryption schemes are principal solution, but it is at the cost of the introducing extra infrastructure and communication. This paper introduces the concept of attribute-based certificatless encryption system (ABCE), which is a new approach to mitigate the key escrow problem in attributebased encryption scheme. In ABCE, the user can choose his own secret key that the KGC cannot obtain. In contrast to attribute-based encryption scheme under multiple authorities, our approach needs less extra cost. Following, we give a generic construction and an improvement in the efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sahai and Waters [2] introduced the concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE). Two variants of ABE were subsequently proposed. In the key-policy variant (KP-ABE) of Goyal, Pandey, Sahai and Waters (GPSW) [3] , every ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes, and every user secret key is associated with a threshold access structure on attributes. Decryption is enabled if and only if the ciphertext attribute set satisfies the access structure on the user secret key. In the ciphertext-policy variant (CP-ABE) of Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters (BSW) [4] , the situation is reversed: attributes are associated with user secret keys and access structures with ciphertexts. Following, in order to make the access structure more expressive, many schemes have been presented [2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] . Simultaneously, schemes [7, 11, 12, and 13] are devoted to get constantsize ciphertexts.
Similar to identity-based encryption schemes, the KGC is able to compute the private key corresponding to any attribute, and he is free to engage in malicious activities without any risk of being confronted in a court of law. The malicious activities could include: decrypting and reading messages meant for any user, which is called the key escrow problem. One approach to mitigate the key escrow problem is to employ multi-authority attributebased encryption, which allow the sender to specify for each authority k a set of attributes monitored by that authority and a number k d so that the message can be decrypted only by a user who has at least k d of the given attributes from every authority. Multi-authority attributebased encryption is an attractive solution and successfully avoids placing trust in a single entity by making the system distributed. However, it is burdensome for a user to go to several key authorities, prove his attributes to each of them and get the corresponding private key component (which has to be done over a secure channel). Building on the ideas from [14] , Chase proposed a solution for multi-authority attributes-based encryption, provided that a trusted central authority is available [15] , but a global identifier is a "linchpin" for tying users' keys together. Her system relied on a central authority and was limited to expressing a strict "AND" policy over a predetermined set of authorities. M u ller, Katzenbeisser, and Eckert [16, 17] give a system with a centralized authority that realizes any LSSS access structure. Their construction builds on the Waters system; their proof is limited to non-adaptive queries. The system achieves roughly the same functionality as the engineering approach above, except one can still acquire attributes from additional authorities without revisiting the central authority. The scheme [18] removed the central authority using a distributed PRF; However, the same limitations of an AND policy of a determined set of authorities remained. Lin ET. al. [17] gives a threshold-based scheme that is also somewhat decentralized. The set of authorities is fixed ahead of time, and they must interact during the system setup. The system is only secure up to collusions of m users, where m is a system parameter chosen at setup such that the cost of operations and key storage scales with m . Scheme [19] proposes a new multi-authority attribute-based encryption system. In their system, any party can become an authority and there is no requirement for any global coordination other than the creation of an initial set of common reference parameters. Reference [20] gave attribute-based threshold signature scheme without a trusted central authority.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give the related preliminaries: To figure axis labels, use words rather than symbols. Do not label axes only with units. Do not label axes with a ratio of quantities and units. Figure labels should be legible, about 9-point type.
Color figures will be appearing only in online publication. All figures will be black and white graphs in print publication.
Ⅲ. DEFINITION AND SECURITY MODEL

A. Definition
Refer to certificateless public key cryptography introduced by Al-Riyami ∈ that was encrypted under the access tree T as inputs, the entity as a recipient runs this deterministic algorithm to get a decryption δ , which is a plaintext message if the set S of attributes satisfies the access tree T .
Definition 2. Key-Policy Attribute-Based ertificateless Encryption
The definition is similar to the ciphertext-policy attribute-based certificateless encryption scheme, and we omit here.
B. Security Model
The following gives the security model for attributebased certificateless encryption scheme:
In order to simulate the attack environment conveniently, we adopt the challenger C and adversary A model. Two kinds of adversaries are considered in the model. One is TypeⅠadversary who cannot know the KGC's master secret key, but can replace any public key in publickeylist with other public keys he chooses. Another is TypeⅡadversary who knows the KGC's master secret key and may still obtain full private keys for arbitrary attributes sets, but is disallowed to replace public key during the game.
In order to simulate the attack environment conveniently, we adopt the challenger C and adversary A model. Two kinds of adversaries are considered in the model. One is TypeⅠadversary who cannot know the KGC's master secret key, but can replace any public key in publickeylist with other public keys he chooses. Another is TypeⅡadversary who knows the KGC's master secret key and may still obtain full private keys for arbitrary attributes sets, but is disallowed to replace public key during the game. A ciphertext-policy attribute-based certificateless encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure against Type Ⅰ adversary if no PPT adversary A of Type Ⅰ has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game played against the challenger:
A is a Type Ⅰ attacker, the challenger takes a security parameter k and runs the setup algorithm. It gives A the master public key mpk , and keeps the master secret key msk to itself.
A is given access to the following oracles: -Public-Key-Request-Oracle: with master public key mpk as input, C chooses a random PK in publickeylist and returns it.
-Public-Key-Replace-Oracle: with a valid public key PK as input, C replaces any one of the public key in publickeylist with PK . -Partial-Private-Key-Extract-Oracle: with attributes set S , master public key mpk , and master secret key msk as input, C searches the PartialPrivateKeylist, and
>to PartialPrivateKey list and returns it to A . , and the ciphertext c C ∈ , if entity's attributes set satisfying the access tree T related with c (ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme), or the attributes related with c satisfies the access tree T (key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme), and then he can get the message as follows:
Otherwise outputs ⊥.
B. Security Analysis Theorem 1. Our ciphertext-policy attribute-based certificateless encryption scheme is at least as secure as the attribute-based encryption scheme or the public key encryption scheme considering Type Ⅰ adversary.
Proof: Assuming 1
A is the Type Ⅰ adversary, and then we can construct an attacker 1 B for attribute-based encryption scheme or an attacker 2 B for public key encryption scheme. Our idea is as follows: 1 B or 2 B simulates the attack environment of 1 A until he attacks attribute-based encryption scheme or public key encryption scheme successively by running 1 A . Case 1: Attribute-based encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure.
Setup: Given the master public keys, 1 B runs public key scheme n times to get n public-secret key pairs , and sends i pk , with the master public keys mpk to 1 A , Phase 1. 1 B answers the queries of 1 A as follows: -Public-Key-Request-Oracle: On receiving the query:
1.
1 B firstly searches PublicKeylist for a public key and returns it. 2. Else, he runs public key scheme to get publicsecret key pair ( , ) i i pk sk and returns i pk as answer.
-Public-Key-Replace-Oracle: On receiving a query pk , 1 B replaces any public key in publickeylist with pk -Partial-Private-Key-Request-Oracle: On receiving a query S U ∈ :
1. -At any time, the set S satisfying the access tree T has not been queried in -Partial-Private-Key-Extract-Oracle with any query of -Public-Key-Replace-Oracle.
From the above analysis, we found, the successful probability of 1 B is at least the same to the successful probability of 1 A . Case 2. If public key encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure, and the attribute-based encryption scheme is not IND-CPA secure. We can prove the successful probability of 2 B attacking the public key encryption is at least the same to 1 A in the light of the above proof method.
The attribute-based certificateless encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure against type Ⅱ adversary can be proved by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If the public key encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure, then our ciphertext-policy attributebased certificateless encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure against Type Ⅱ adversary.
The security analysis for key-policy attribute-based certificateless encryption scheme is similar to the one of ciphertext-policy attribute-based certificateless encryption scheme.
V. IMPROVEMENT
The scheme from the above section is fit for the small universe of attributes or small group of users. If there are lager universe of attributes or more potential users, the scheme has lower efficiency due to the encryption scheme and more public keys. In this section, we improve on the above attribute-based certificateless encryption scheme by using of k -sibling intractable function families and one-way trapdoor function family.
Let PartialPrivateKeyExtract; SetSec; SetPriv; SetPub; Encrypt; Decrypt) be the attribute-based certificateless encryption scheme from the above attribute-based encryption scheme , k-sibling intractable function families and one-way trapdoor function, and the construction is as follows: -SetUp: run Setup′ of attribute-based encryption scheme to get the master secret key msk and master public key mpk . The master public key mpk includes a description of the ciphertext space C . If entity's attributes set satisfying the access tree T related with c (ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme), or the attributes related with c satisfies the access tree T (key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme), and then he can get the message as follows: 
Otherwise outputs . ⊥
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we give the new definition for attributebased certificateless encryption scheme, and a generic construction is presented. The security of the generic construction is at least the same as the attribute-based encryption scheme. Of course, in order to give IND-CCA secure scheme, we can depend on weaker attribute-based encryption scheme, which is our further research. In order to improve the efficiency of attribute-based certificateless encryption scheme, we get an improvement by using a ksibling intractable function family, and the improvement has shorter public key and efficient encryption and decryption scheme. Furthermore, our scheme is fit for key updating when there are users changed.
Guoyan Zhang born in Shandong of China in 1977, and received the Ph.D. degree in information security from Shandong University, Jinan, Shandong, China, in 2008. Her research interests include attribute-based cryptography system and certificateless encryption scheme.
She is currently a lecturer in school of computer science and technology of Shandong University.
